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NO OIL FOR THE LAMPS OF CHINA?
Gabriel B. Collins and William S. Murray
The ubiquitous Made in China stickers and labels on consumer products re-mind us daily of China’s incredible economic rise. The world is accustomed
to this powerful phenomenon and seems to expect that China’s economy will
grow at 10 percent annually for at least another decade. Such remarkable eco-
nomic progress has lifted millions of Chinese out of poverty and also substan-
tially benefited the global economy. It is also arguably the cornerstone of
Chinese Communist Party legitimacy.
Western and Asian hunger for inexpensive Chinese goods fuels much of this
growth, but China’s economic engine cannot run without imports of raw mate-
rials, such as bauxite, iron ore, timber, and, perhaps most significantly, crude oil.
Once a significant exporter, China became a net importer of crude in 1993 and
now struggles to deal with this dependency.
Chinese security analysts fear that oil import dependency is a potential pres-
sure point that could be exploited by future adversar-
ies of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).1
Approximately 80 percent of China’s 3.3 million bar-
rels per day (bpd) in crude oil imports passes through
the Straits of Malacca. Such funneling could facilitate
interdiction of China’s oil lifeline in times of crisis.2
The United States, India, and Japan are all seen as po-
tential blockaders, but Chinese observers appear to
believe that only the United States has both the capa-
bility and the will to blockade oil shipments to China.3
One recent Chinese article postulates that the most
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likely triggers of an oil blockade of China include a fight over Taiwan and a situa-
tion in which China’s rise becomes hostile and directly threatening to other ma-
jor powers.4
Some Chinese analysts argue that the need to protect shipments of oil and
other vital raw materials is a key driver behind the PRC’s intensive aerial and na-
val modernization programs.5 Yet despite impressive improvements, the Peo-
ple’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) lacks the ability to defend the sea lines of
communication (SLOCs) over which Chinese oil supplies flow. Among other
limitations, the PLAN lacks guaranteed access to ports for refueling, repairing,
and replenishing as well as adequate numbers of at-sea-replenishment vessels
necessary to support long-range missions. More fundamentally, the PLAN
rarely undertakes long-distance operations, which would provide vital training
and experience for SLOC-protection missions.
In contrast, some of Beijing’s potential adversaries have decades of blue-water
experience, world-class logistical capacity, global access to replenishment ports,
and doctrine and equipment oriented toward warfare on the high seas. Beijing’s
strategists recognize this disparity and are presumably devising plans to counter
any possible future efforts to cut China’s petroleum umbilical cord.
This article examines potential Chinese responses to possible forms of energy
blockade.6 The first two sections discuss how a distant blockade might be con-
ducted and surveys possible Chinese responses to such an action. The third sec-
tion hypothesizes a close blockade and then analyzes potential courses of action
in response. The fourth section examines the possibility of a “blockade by con-
voy,” while the final section considers an energy-denial strategy that would tar-
get China’s ability to transport and process crude oil.
The authors conclude that an energy blockade of China would not only fail to
achieve its objective but also send destructive shock waves through the global
economic and political landscape. Frankly discussing energy sea-lane security
will, ideally, promote trust and lay a foundation for deeper energy security coop-
eration between China and other major oil consumers.
ASSUMPTIONS
The imperatives of continued economic growth and global interdependence
among states make major wars unlikely. Nonetheless, this analysis assumes a
state of war between the PRC and the blockading state. Even an “embargo” im-
plemented as a measure short of war would likely trigger open hostilities, be-
cause it would threaten China’s continued economic growth and would be
interpreted by Beijing as an intolerable and unjustifiable breach of sovereignty.
We assume, therefore, that Beijing would interpret a blockade under any name
as an act of war and would respond accordingly.
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This article also assumes that if faced with an energy blockade China would
restrict or prohibit the use of private automobiles and other nonessential trans-
portation and ration the sale of all liquid fuels to commercial users. These and
similar measures would reduce PRC oil needs, perhaps even to levels that could
be sustained with domestic production and Kazakh and Russian pipeline and
rail imports. China’s indigenous oil sources currently provide more than 3.5
million bpd and by 2010 could reach 4 million bpd. For comparison purposes, in
fiscal year 2004 the U.S. military, fighting wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and sus-
taining normal operations as well, used approximately 395,000 bpd of oil.7
While U.S. military fuel consumption levels cannot be directly correlated with
those of the Chinese military in a hypothetical context, these figures strongly
suggest that even in a high-intensity conflict the PRC would have access to suffi-
cient fuel to run its military machine, as well as most portions of its current
economy, assuming that the export channels and the import of critical
nonenergy imports continued unabated.
We acknowledge that a blockade that prohibited fuel imports while permit-
ting the continued shipment of other raw materials to China, as well as the ex-
port of finished products, is an artificial and unlikely contingency. A
comprehensive ban on maritime shipping in and out of Chinese ports would
have a far more powerful effect than an energy blockade alone. However, much
of the Chinese internal discussion on blockades deals directly with the possibil-
ity of a maritime energy blockade.
MODES OF BLOCKADE AND POSSIBLE PRC RESPONSES
The Distant Blockade
An energy blockade of China could be initiated at such choke points as the
Malacca and Hormuz straits, both of which lie far from the Chinese coast. Chi-
nese analysts worry, perhaps with good reason, that a relatively small number of
warships could in that way effectively sever China’s oil lifeline. After all, a distant
maritime energy blockade might be very attractive to civilian policy makers and
military planners preparing for conflict with China. If successful, such a course
might achieve political objectives with very low levels of violence.8 Additionally,
at least in the near term, there would seem little that China’s conventional mili-
tary forces could do to challenge such a blockade directly.
One of the greatest obstacles facing the PRC in such a scenario would be the
distance of the energy choke points from its naval bases. China’s naval vessels
rarely operate very far from their home waters or for very long and, with a few
exceptions, probably lack the experience necessary to undertake extended, dis-
tant missions during wartime. Compounding this weakness, Beijing’s limited
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number of replenishment vessels is inadequate for and inexperienced in sustain-
ing distant operations.9 In the near term, therefore, any PLAN counterblockade
task force would be operating at or beyond the limits of its professional ability
and combat range. Blockading forces, on the other hand, would probably suffer
from neither limitation. Another feature of the long distances involved is that
PLAN ships would likely be detected well before they could bring their weapons
within range, if not immediately after departing their home ports. During its en-
tire transit, therefore, a PRC surface action group would be vulnerable to subsea,
surface, and aerial threats at locations of the blockading force’s choosing.
Another symmetrical option available to the PLA would be attacks by
air-launched antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs) against blockading vessels. Yet
the distances involved, the likely early detection of incoming aircraft, and the
lack of an adequate in-flight refueling ability would be severe impediments. Fur-
thermore, PRC bombers and strike aircraft operating far from mainland China
would be highly vulnerable to surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), land-based
air-superiority fighters, and carrier-based aircraft. China possesses approxi-
mately ninety highly capable Su-30 fighter bombers that could conceivably
reach the Straits of Malacca, conduct strikes against enemy surface warships
there, and return to base. Such an operation would, however, require a level of
proficiency in aerial refueling and long-range strike operations that the PLA has
yet to demonstrate. Thus, successful aerial attacks against blockading forces are
presently unlikely, although the situation could change if the PLA develops the
doctrine, infrastructure, and experience necessary.
Alternatively, China could threaten distant blockading ships with its subma-
rine force. However, its submarines would be at a disadvantage; any attempt to
transit from a mainland base to the Straits of Malacca would have to overcome
the antisubmarine efforts of the blockading powers, some of which could be ex-
tremely sophisticated.10 Beijing’s diesel-powered submarines would be forced to
snorkel frequently, greatly increasing the probability of detection and destruc-
tion. China’s limited number of notoriously noisy nuclear-powered attack sub-
marines (SSNs) could deploy from their North Sea Fleet base but would be
vulnerable while en route. PLAN submarines also rarely undertake long patrols
and so are likely to have little institutional knowledge of how to conduct such an
operation.
China’s submarines, furthermore, would have little utility if the blockade were
conducted in the Straits of Malacca. Many portions of those waters are too shallow
to allow the submerged passage or sustained operation of any submarine. If the
blockade were on the western approaches to the strait proper, PLAN submarines
would have to either pass through on the surface, and be readily detected and at-
tacked, or transit submerged around the Indonesian archipelago, making the
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journey that much longer and more challenging. For a variety of reasons, shallow
waters greatly inhibit the use of torpedoes, thereby depriving submarines of their
most lethal weapons, at least in many areas of the straits. ASCMs would also be of
limited use, since their difficulty in discriminating among targets would make
successful attack on a warship in the crowded strait statistically unlikely, especially
from longer ranges.11 The same arguments apply to the Strait of Hormuz. PLAN
submarines, consequently, are not a counterblockade panacea, though the threat
they represent cannot be completely dismissed. It must also be said that should the
Shang or follow-on classes of Chinese SSNs—or even, to a somewhat more lim-
ited extent, air-independent-propulsion diesel submarines—prove sufficiently
quiet and are capably operated, the threat they would pose to surface warships
would be significantly increased.
Since Beijing has limited ability to oppose directly forces conducting a distant
energy blockade, it might seriously consider taking retaliatory actions else-
where.12 One option available includes using submarines to mine the entrances
to a blockader’s commercial ports and naval bases. Others include using short-
and medium-range ballistic missiles to pummel regional targets and attacking a
blockader’s replenishment ships with submarines.13 There is strong evidence
that China has developed a land-attack cruise missile similar to the Tomahawk.14
In the near future, this weapon, particularly variants launched by long-range
bombers or submarines, could be employed against a wide range of critical re-
gional targets, giving China a powerful asymmetric response option. The PLAN
could also mine the approaches to an opponent’s harbors with submarines or
converted merchant ships. Defending against these threats would tax the block-
ading navy by forcing individual ships to be on the tactical defensive throughout
the region, thereby straining the theater’s military forces overall as they strug-
gled to protect vulnerable infrastructure. A host of other escalatory steps could
be taken in response to an energy blockade, perhaps even including the use of
nuclear weapons, notwithstanding China’s “no first use” pledge.
But if the distant blockade seems relatively attractive from a blockading
state’s point of view, its implementation poses several critical challenges. Cap-
tured ships would have to be sent to a central marshaling area. If the crew proved
unwilling, the blockader would have to supply a prize crew of mariners to take
the ship there, in addition to a warship escort. This could be a complex under-
taking, especially if multiple vessels were seized in a short period of time. It is
unlikely that many military sailors have the necessary knowledge to operate oil
tankers, and certainly naval ship-manning requirements are not set with an eye
to prize crews. Selecting the marshaling area would also likely be problematic,
since Southeast Asian states might balk at openly abetting the blockading state.
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Further, many, if not most, harbors are too shallow to allow the entry of
deep-draft supertankers.
Aside from the seized tankers themselves, blockading forces would face the
perplexing issue of what to do with the seized crews and cargoes. Tanker crews
are often multinational.15 The owners of seized ships and cargoes would pre-
sumably vigorously protest to their governments;16 their pressure, in turn, on the
blockading state to release the ships might lead to the phenomenon, not infre-
quent in blockades, of having to seize the same ship more than once.17
The oil trade’s flexibility would also make a distant blockade difficult to exe-
cute. Fifty-two tankers pass through the Straits of Malacca daily, carrying ap-
proximately 11.7 million barrels of crude oil.18 A blockading naval force would
have to determine which of these tankers carried, among them, the roughly 3.3
million of these daily barrels that were bound for China.19 Presumably, tankers
sailing under PRC flags or having known PRC ownership would also be rela-
tively easy to distinguish and stop. Yet only about 10 percent of China’s energy
imports are presently carried on domestic hulls, a fact that would force a block-
ader to identify and intercept the other 90 percent.20 A very large crude carrier
(VLCC) of 250,000 deadweight tons (DWT) serving the Arabian Gulf–Far East
route typically carries just under two million barrels of crude oil per trip. This
suggests that as few as two VLCCs can carry China’s daily crude oil imports, and
that would seem to bode well for a navy contemplating a distant maritime en-
ergy blockade. Yet the tankers carrying oil to China on any given day could be in
any of a wide range of configurations, depending on commercial concerns that
will be discussed shortly, and their number could range from two vessels to ten
or more. This larger prospective volume suggests that identifying in advance
which tankers are destined for the PRC would be problematic. Each tanker pass-
ing through the strait, therefore, would have to be boarded, and its shipping doc-
uments examined. Any tanker with a legitimate bill of lading that stated the oil
was destined for Japan, Korea, the Philippines, or elsewhere would have to be al-
lowed to proceed;21 those stating a PRC destination would be seized.
But a distant blockade would be easy to defeat using conventional commercial
means. For instance, it is not unusual for cargoes to be sold between ports of em-
barkation and destination; some oil cargoes are resold on the spot market as many
as thirty times while the tankers carrying them are still at sea.22 This suggests that
the cargo of a tanker with a legitimate bill of lading for, say, Korea could be sold to
PRC interests after it had been inspected at the blockade and allowed to pass. This
feature of the modern oil trade would greatly reduce any state’s ability to deter-
mine a tanker’s final destination by examining only the bill of lading. In addition,
oil cargoes are frequently “parceled out,” with one tanker carrying oil bound for
several consumers.23 For example, of a VLCC’s two-million-barrel crude oil cargo,
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five hundred thousand barrels might be headed to Singapore, five hundred thou-
sand to South Korea, and a million to the PRC. If an embargo against oil ship-
ments to China seemed imminent, parceling would likely quickly rise as Chinese
oil importers sought to avoid being singled out. Even if a shipper honestly de-
clared that a quarter of the cargo was headed to China, a blockader might create
very serious diplomatic and economic repercussions if it detained a vessel that was
also carrying crude to South Korean and Singaporean buyers. This would be par-
ticularly true in the case of a conflict over Taiwan, as regional nations might resist
taking sides in a confrontation between the PRC and an outside power.
Shipping documents can also be forged. Forgery can be quite sophisticated,
especially if (as it no doubt would be in this case) abetted by the PRC govern-
ment. The blockading force would probably find no tankers with bills of lading
that declared China as their destination. The Chinese government and
state-owned energy companies could almost certainly offer private shippers and
oil producers sufficient compensation to ensure their complicity in such a
scheme.
Another issue would be how to stop a ship that simply refused to stop and be
boarded. Sinking an uncooperative supertanker seems implausible in condi-
tions short of total war, given the value of the cargo, the environmental havoc
created by the resulting oil spill, and the threat to the civilian crew. With high
enough stakes, a blockader might use the minimum force necessary to ensure
compliance, but serious diplomatic repercussions could follow disabling fire di-
rected against a foreign vessel (e.g., a Greek or Norwegian supertanker). A
blockader would probably be able to stop uncooperative ships without gunfire
or other lethal force, but those means could be overtaxed if enough ships resisted
boarding. Beijing could orchestrate disobedience; blockaders might encounter
ten vessels in one day that refused to stop.
Maritime insurance and its effect on oil transport during war is also worth
consideration. Under normal operating conditions, hull insurance for a tanker
runs between 2.5 percent and 3.75 percent on an annualized basis.24 Thus, a
tanker owner operating a $130 million VLCC can expect to pay $8,900–$13,300
a day in insurance costs. Lloyd’s of London, like other insurers, however, auto-
matically revokes hull insurance upon any outbreak of war between China and
the United Kingdom, France, the United States, or Russia, potentially meaning
that all shipping to and from China would automatically stop during hostili-
ties.25 In practice, however, cargo owners and shippers can obtain compensating
coverage, known as “hull war risks and strikes” policies, if they operate in a de-
clared war-risk exclusion zone.26 In waters so designated, rates can climb to 7.5
percent to 10 percent of a ship’s value on a per-trip basis, meaning that the same
VLCC operator would have to pay between $8.9 and $13.3 million per trip to
C O L L I N S & M U R R A Y 8 5
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insure his ship while it was in the danger zone.27 Beijing would have to subsidize
such costs, either directly or indirectly, if it wanted delivery of oil on privately
owned vessels to continue.
PRC state-owned tankers could conceivably be self-insured and thereby con-
tinue oil delivery to the home country without paying such premiums. This may
explain recent efforts by Chinese nationally owned shipping corporations to
build and operate larger fleets of oil tankers. In addition, it is possible that the
PRC could entice shippers and shipowners with direct payments or through
some type of laundering mechanism. A high enough return can induce some
shippers to send vessels into war zones without insurance. Crews willing to sail
them can also be found, for the right price.28 In such ways, insurance barriers
during blockades would likely be overcome.
Yet another method of sidestepping the blockade would involve avoiding the
Malacca Straits altogether by sailing tankers through the Lombok and Sunda
straits, or even circumnavigating
Australia and approaching East
Asia from the open Pacific.29 This
would render a distant blockade
even more unlikely to achieve its
goal and would necessitate addi-
tional forces. Tanker rerouting
would result in four to sixteen
days of disrupted oil shipments to
East Asian consumers depending
on whether shippers rerouted
through the Lombok Strait or all
the way around Australia. That in
turn would drive up shipping
rates and final prices for all oil
consumers. The figure shows the increased tanker demand and delivery disrup-
tion times that would result from rerouting tankers around the Malacca Straits.
In any case, a distant blockade would be unable to interdict oil transshipped
from neighboring nations to China. The blockading state could exert pressure
on East Asian nations to prohibit such transshipments, but the economic incen-
tive to allow them would doubtless be considerable. Furthermore, preventing
transshipment would mean intercepting—in close proximity to the main-
land—large numbers of smaller ships carrying oil cargo into China, a problem
that will be discussed shortly.
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Estimating Required Forces. The practical problems associated with conducting
a distant blockade suggest a robust force structure. That would have a high op-
portunity cost, because it would reduce the number of ships available to deal
with the conflict that prompted the blockade in the first place. The number of
surface warships necessary to conduct a distant blockade can be roughly esti-
mated. The driving factor is the need to ascertain which tankers passing through
the Straits of Malacca contain oil bound for China. If each tanker must be
boarded, a given warship can send teams on board four tankers in a
twenty-four-hour period, and fifty-two tankers pass through the strait every
day, as at present, thirteen surface warships are needed. If the number of tankers
requiring boarding could be winnowed—say, if bills of lading could somehow
be verified electronically—the number could be reduced. Perhaps then six sur-
face warships would be able to conduct the necessary boardings and inspections,
with one dedicated replenishment vessel.30
The ships on station, however many there are, would also require in-theater
replacements for maintenance or combat casualties, as well as backups should
any of the blockading ships be diverted to escort or pursuit functions. It appears
then, that at least ten surface warships and two replenishment vessels would be
required to establish an effective and protected distant blockade at the Straits of
Malacca. This number would increase proportionally if the Lombok Strait,
Sunda Strait, and the route around Australia also had to be patrolled. The au-
thors estimate that three surface warships and accompanying replenishment
vessels per additional strait would be necessary to provide reasonable assurance
that all passing tankers could be boarded, inspected, and if necessary escorted to
a quarantine anchorage. This gives a minimum total of sixteen surface warships
and four replenishment vessels, counting neither the supporting forces that
would be necessary to interdict and defeat any attacking PRC counterblockade
forces or the units necessary to relieve the initial group. Clearly, only large navies
would be capable of contemplating such a blockade.
More Limitations, and PRC Options. In addition to the problems mentioned
above, a distant maritime energy blockade would be unable to prevent the over-
land transport of oil into China. As with the transshipment to smaller ships, eco-
nomic incentives would drive oil delivery to China in significant amounts via
pipeline, train, truck, or other means. Russia currently ships over three hundred
thousand barrels per day of oil to China by rail and anticipates being able to
pipeline up to 280,000 bpd of crude to northern China by the end of 2008. Sever-
ing these overland oil flows would require attacking critical infrastructure deep
within Chinese territory, with all the escalatory risks such strikes would entail.
C O L L I N S & M U R R A Y 8 7
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Notably, no blockade of China in history has succeeded without Russian
acquiescence.
China also has diplomatic options should it be subjected to a blockade. Un-
less China committed some misdeed of such magnitude as to unite the interna-
tional community against it, a blockading power would likely face Beijing alone.
China’s vital role in the global economy means that a blockader, while it might
be militarily superior, would face extreme international pressure to conclude
operations quickly. Such pressure would rise steadily as economic damage
mounted, whereas even if conducted flawlessly the blockade would probably
take months or even years to register its full effect; eventually the blockader
would alienate its allies and even become an international pariah. Meanwhile,
international diplomacy would severely hamper the blockade. Beijing would
doubtless employ its proven diplomatic ability to align states sharing its energy
and economic interests, thus raising the diplomatic, economic, and even
military costs for the blockader.
Among other diplomatic options, the PRC might decide or threaten to prolif-
erate previously denied arms to states unfriendly to those conducting the block-
ade, or renege on previous agreements that benefited the blockading state.
Beijing could also reflag its tankers to a third nation and thereby greatly compli-
cate the legalities involved in boarding them. It is likely that Chinese planners,
believing that an energy blockader could in some such way convince or compel
some states to acquiesce to boarding, searching, and interdiction, might place
vessels under the flags of states that a blockader would be reluctant to confront.
Such ships could sail through a distant blockade with impunity, unless the
blockading state were prepared to risk broadening the conflict.
China might also attempt to disrupt the energy systems of its opponents.
Hurricane Katrina demonstrated the fragility of Gulf Coast oil production, re-
fining, and distribution; other nations dependent on hydrocarbon imports
doubtless have similarly vulnerable concentrations of energy infrastructure.
China could conduct physical or electronic attacks against such critical nodes
and so limit the amount of oil blockading nations could themselves import. At-
tacks against financial, electrical, and even food distribution networks are also
conceivable and could have very profound effects.
In short, although China would not be able to counter a distant oil blockade
effectively by traditional military might, it would likely be able to reduce a block-
ade’s effectiveness greatly by commercial, diplomatic, and unconventional mili-
tary means. Even if Beijing could not maintain its peacetime level of oil imports,
domestic production, overland importation, and restrictions on consumption
would allow it to hold out as long as the population remained convinced that the
objective that had brought about the blockade was worth the cost.
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Simultaneously, global business and diplomatic interests would doubtless
clamor for a resumption of trade with China. Such a scenario would seem to be
to Beijing’s, and not a blockader’s, advantage.
The “Supply Side” Blockade
A state contemplating an energy blockade against China might consider a “sup-
ply side” blockade, in which major oil exporters would be forbidden to sell oil to
China. Such an approach could be enforced by either inducing the countries to
reduce exports by an amount equal to their average exports to China or moni-
toring outbound tankers and taking punitive actions against those carrying car-
goes to China. A supply-side blockade, however, would likely require the use of
force to achieve cooperation from recalcitrant oil exporters like Iran or Vene-
zuela, thereby substantially widening the conflict. In addition, by reducing the
total amount of oil available to the world market, a supply-side embargo would
trigger frantic bidding by China and other major consumers, causing increased
costs for all oil consumers, including those in the blockading state. Furthermore,
as the 1973 Arab oil embargo demonstrated, the embargoed country eventually
receives oil, even from the embargoing states, at increased prices and through
third parties. A supply-side blockade, consequently, would be neither effective
nor feasible.
The Close Blockade
If a distant blockade cut off delivery of oil to China via large tankers, it is likely
that delivery via smaller vessels would increase, in response to this new demand
signal. A blockading state would be forced to consider a close blockade.
A close blockade would entail placing surface warships in close proximity to
China’s three major oil-handling port concentrations, Guangzhou/Hong Kong,
Shanghai/Ningbo, and Tianjin/Dalian. Each of these concentrations would re-
quire perhaps six surface combatants to conduct the boardings, inspections,
and, if necessary, seizures of ships attempting to run the blockade. Blockading
forces would also have to be prepared to stop, or at least greatly reduce, the coast-
wise traffic of smaller ships between Chinese and other Asian countries. In all, a
close blockade would require tens of surface warships near the Chinese coast.
The risks to them in a wartime environment would be substantial; the blockad-
ing state would probably quickly find itself in a naval and aerial war of attrition.
A blockading state would be tempted, in order to achieve the upper hand in such
a scenario, to strike at PLAN supporting infrastructure (e.g., command and con-
trol nodes, fleet headquarters, and fuel depots). Such actions could prove dan-
gerously escalatory and define a critical difference between the distant and close
blockades.
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Blockade by Convoy
Another option available to the blockading state would be to implement a sys-
tem of convoys—not for defensive purposes but to ensure compliance with an
energy embargo against China. Each convoy would consist of tankers bound for
neutral and friendly Asian states and would be escorted by a surface warship. No
other tankers would be permitted to sail in eastern Pacific waters. That seems
simple, but assuming that five VLCCs per day would be needed to supply
non-Chinese Asian oil demand, the logistics would overwhelm most or even all
navies. Each group of five VLCCs would require a round-trip sailing time of up-
ward of twenty days between Singapore and Japan or South Korea—which are
the two largest non-Chinese oil consumers in Asia—plus a two-day turnaround,
making cycles of twenty-two separate convoy groups, one leaving per day; each
would need at least one escort and corresponding replenishment ships. Addi-
tional ships would be required to allow maintenance to be performed on the es-
corting ships and to establish patrols to ensure that no cheaters entered China
from the east or from other routes. All this would require an enormous force
structure; it could be mounted only by the largest of navies, and only with the
active cooperation of neighboring states.
CALIBRATED ENERGY-ACCESS DENIAL
AND POSSIBLE CHINESE RESPONSES
Given the shortcomings of the maritime blockade options discussed above, a
blockading state might seek an alternative way to deny China energy imports. A
possible method of at least partially achieving the intent of an energy blockade
would involve preventing China from processing and distributing oil, regardless
of how it got into the country. China, like all other major oil consumers, is vul-
nerable to precision attacks on key energy infrastructure, such as refineries and
pumping stations. The destruction of critical infrastructure components could
almost completely deny China the ability to process crude oil or transport re-
fined products efficiently. This could conceivably be achieved with minimal de-
struction and violence while minimizing risk to attacking forces.
A sufficiently capable adversary could conceivably destroy such a target set in
a very short time. Conversely, an attacker might adopt a calibrated approach as a
method of demonstrating resolve and increasing incentives for negotiated set-
tlement. In such a scheme, oil off-loading wharves and adjacent strategic petro-
leum reserve facilities could be attacked first, followed perhaps by pumping
stations on the Chinese portion of pipelines carrying oil from Kazakhstan and
Russia, and finally, if necessary, by strikes on oil refineries. With key refining
units thus disabled, China would lose the ability to produce liquid fuels from pe-
troleum for six or more months.31
9 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
12
Naval War College Review, Vol. 61 [2008], No. 2, Art. 10
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol61/iss2/10
Yet unlike imposing a naval blockade, which can be quickly reversed, destroy-
ing refinery components that take a half-year or more to replace would have se-
rious long-term repercussions for China’s economy and would effectively
constitute an irreversible act, likely to trigger conflict escalation. Compounding
these escalatory dangers, Russia and Kazakhstan could react strongly to the loss
of significant portions of their energy exports and to the prospect of political,
social, and economic upheaval on the other side of their Chinese borders.
PRC military planners undoubtedly realize that the destruction of energy in-
frastructure could appeal to an adversary. The PRC’s heavy investment in ad-
vanced air defense systems, such as the Russian SA-10 and S-300 and indigenous
variants like the HQ-9, suggests that countermeasures to precision weaponry
upon which such a scheme would depend are being acquired.32 China could also
defend against such a campaign by stockpiling parts necessary for quickly re-
building critical energy nodes. Fear of precision conventional attacks on energy
infrastructure and other critical potential targets could also explain why China’s
naval modernization seems designed to render its fleet able to push opposing
forces beyond the “first island chain,” and hence eventually out of manned tacti-
cal aircraft and cruise missile range.33
If China were subjected to a precision energy infrastructure destruction cam-
paign, it could employ the same retaliatory options described earlier. Nonethe-
less, Beijing’s symmetrical military response options would be less likely to be
effective, since naval forces supporting the precision campaign would operate at
distances from China sufficient to provide some measure of safety. This diffi-
culty in responding in a parallel manner would, however, only increase the
escalatory pressures that accompanied the crisis leading to the blockade’s
imposition.
An even more critical failing of an energy denial campaign is that it immedi-
ately involves strikes conducted against the PRC mainland. This is antithetical to
the purpose of naval blockades, which could be considered a desirable use of mili-
tary power specifically in that they rely on a limited use of force that can be modu-
lated and, if necessary, withdrawn quickly, with little permanent damage done. In
contrast, any actions, such as those involved in a precision energy-denial cam-
paign, that significantly endanger Chinese economic growth also threaten the sur-
vival of Chinese leaders and their regime’s legitimacy, thereby producing extreme
escalatory pressures. Beijing has long maintained a nuclear deterrent, which is be-
ing made extensively more survivable through the addition of a long-range ballis-
tic missile on new missile-carrying submarines (SSBNs) and road-mobile ICBM
systems. Occasional mutterings and dark allusions from senior PLA officers sug-
gesting a willingness to trade nuclear blows raise real questions as to what consti-
tutes Beijing’s nuclear “red lines.” One would hope that such scenarios would be
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avoided in all but the most fundamental and unconstrained struggles for national
survival.
RECALIBRATING CONVENTIONAL WISDOM
A distant naval energy blockade, though it could be conducted with low to mod-
erate tactical risk with some navies’ force structures, could probably not prevent
the delivery of oil to China by means of alternative sea routes, falsified bills of
lading, or transshipment of oil via third parties. Such a blockade will become
even less feasible as China extends the reach and lethality of its naval and aerial
forces. A close blockade, on the other hand, would require large numbers of
ships to operate in close proximity to the PRC’s impressive and increasingly le-
thal antiaccess weaponry, where they would be subject to attrition, with atten-
dant escalatory risk. A blockade by convoy would also require a very large force
structure, and a supply-side blockade of oil shipments to the PRC would only
drive up prices for all global oil consumers.
None of these blockade schemes could prevent the flow of oil into China via
pipeline, rail, or truck, and none could prevent China from extracting oil from
its interior oil fields. In 2005, domestic sources accounted for over 60 percent of
the oil that China consumed. That same year imported oil constituted only
about 10 percent of China’s overall energy consumption. These numbers
strongly suggest that China could withstand a complete denial of seaborne oil
imports. Furthermore, effective blockades typically take years to achieve their
goals and even then succeed only when they are a part of a comprehensive mili-
tary action that usually includes invasion or massive aerial bombardment.34 It is
difficult to imagine a limited-war scenario that would justify such actions by any
blockading nation.
The primary conclusion of this article’s examination of blockade scenarios,
then, is that, contrary to what appears to pass for conventional wisdom among
naval analysts and observers in the PRC, China is not fundamentally vulnerable
to a maritime energy blockade in circumstances other than global war.35 This
view has far-reaching implications. For one, it suggests that China does not need
to build up naval capacity for the purpose of defending energy SLOCs against
potentially hostile naval forces.
Such a realization might recalibrate internal Chinese discussions in ways that
increase transparency and engender increased trust between China and con-
cerned regional powers. This in turn potentially opens the door for much more
meaningful naval and SLOC security cooperation between the PLAN and other
navies. The twin trends of China’s skyrocketing resource demands and the accel-
erating tendency of regional countries to modernize their navies creates a dire
need for frank discussions on core energy and maritime security issues.
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